Sumitro Banerjee holds a PhD and MSc in Management from INSEAD, an MBA in International Business from the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (New Delhi), and a Bachelor of Technology in Mining Machinery from the Indian Institute of Technology-Indian School of Mines (Dhanbad).
He is an Associate Professor of Marketing at Grenoble Ecole de Management (GEM), where he teaches courses on strategic and international marketing, digital marketing and advertising, brand management, product development, and the marketing of digital products and services. Before joining GEM in 2017, he was an Associate Professor and the Ferrero Chair in International Marketing at the European School of Management and Technology (ESMT) in Berlin. Previously, from 2004 to 2008, he served as an Assistant Professor of Marketing at the Martin J. Whitman School of Management, Syracuse University (New York).
With over 20 years of teaching experience across MBA, EMBA, MSc, and undergraduate programs, Sumitro has designed and led executive education programs for participants from Fortune 500 companies. He has also worked as a consultant for multiple organizations.
His research focuses on new product development, the diffusion of innovations, market entry strategies, and sales force incentives, utilizing microeconomics and game theory. His work has been published in Production and Operations Management, International Journal of Research in Marketing, and Quantitative Marketing and Economics. He serves as an ad hoc Area Editor and a member of the Editorial Review Board for the International Journal of Research in Marketing, where he was recognized as an Outstanding Editorial Review Board Member in 2023. Additionally, he has reviewed research for Marketing Science, International Journal of Research in Marketing, and Production and Operations Management.
Before transitioning to academia, Sumitro managed international trading operations at Tata Steel and served as the executive assistant to the Director of International Trade. He began his career as an engineer specializing in longwall mining equipment at Jessop and Company.
- Développement de produits nouveaux
- Force de vente
- High Tech
- Innovation
- Marketing et Economie
- Responsabilité sociale des entreprises
- Product Management and Development - Master - De 2022 à 2024
- Nouveau produit : de l'innovation au management du portefeuille produit - Master - 2022
- International Perspectives in Marketing - Master - Depuis 2024
- Brand Management and Product Development - Master - De 2017 à 2019
- Branding and Brand Equity Management - Master - De 2018 à 2019
- Strategic Marketing and Marketing Planning - Master - De 2018 à 2025
- Research Methods - Master - Depuis 2024
- Digital Marketing and Adversiting 1 : Digital and web Marketing - Master - Depuis 2024
- Digital Marketing and Advertising 3 : SEO and SEA - Master - Depuis 2024
- Digital Marketing and Advertising 4 : Digital Advertising - Master - Depuis 2024
- International Marketing - Formation Continue - 2017
- Marketing Digital - Formation Continue - De 2021 à 2022
- Strategic Marketing and Marketing Planning - Master - De 2016 à 2017
- Strategic Marketing and Marketing Planning - Master - De 2017 à 2018
- Strategic Marketing and Marketing Planning - Master - Depuis 2017
- Global Marketing and Strategy - Formation Continue - 2020
- Banerjee S., 2025.Rational learning of CSR as a credence attributeEMAC Spring Conference 2025, EIASM, European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management, Madrid, EspagneWe consider corporate social responsibility (CSR) an additional credence attribute of products sold in the markets by firms. We show that a firm that receives private signals about CSR, transmits information to consumers only if the mean of the signals exceeds a threshold. In the general Gaussian model of CSR, a firm with product quality below a threshold meets this criterion. In a competitive market with vertically differentiated firms, in contrast, under commonly observed market conditions, a high-quality firm transmits information while a low-quality firm does not. We also show that rational learning of CSR is robust under asymmetric information about the precision of the private signals. The firm with a higher precision of signals distorts its price either upwards or downwards to reveal its type, forcing the firm with low precision to choose its complete information strategy. In a simple binary model, the firm either transmits the information creating hype or does not transmit any information thereby downplaying CSR depending on the sampling distribution of the signals. Moreover, the firm transmits information to consumers only if the mean of the information transmitted by the independent monitors is below a threshold.
- Banerjee S., 2025.Rational learning of CSR as a credence attribute22nd Marketing Dynamics Conference, Marketing Science Conference, Goa, Inde
- Banerjee S., 2024.Sales process & marketing with incentives: Selling hard or soft53rd Annual Conference of The European Marketing Academy, EMAC European Marketing Academy, Bucharest, Roumanie
- Banerjee S., 2024.Consumer learning of corporate social responsibility: the hyped and the understated2024 ISMS Marketing Science Conference, INFORMS Society for Marketing Science, Sydney, Australie
- Banerjee S., 2024.Vaporware or costly signal? – It depends…Theory + Practice in Marketing Conference, McCombs School of Business, University of Texas, Austin, Etats-Unis
- Banerjee S., 2023.Patent Assertion, Defense, And The Proliferation Of LawsuitsISMS Marketing Science Conference, INFORMS Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, Miami, Etats-Unis
- Banerjee S., 2021.Demand-pull, carbon tax, and net carbon emissionsISMS Marketing Science Virtual Conference, INFORMS Society for Marketing Science, Online, Etats-Unis
- Banerjee S., 2020.Crowding out and over-provision of corporate social responsibilityISMS Marketing Science Virtual Conference, INFORMS Society for Marketing Science, Online, Etats-Unis
- Banerjee S., 2019.The power of fake news on user generated contentISMS Marketing Science Conference, INFORMS Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, Roma, Italie
- Banerjee S., Thevaranjan A. P., 2019.Targeting and Salesforce Compensation: When Sales Spill Over To Unprofitable CustomersQuantitative Marketing and Economics, 17, 1: 81-104Targeting selling efforts towards profitable customers is widely known to increase sales and allow firms to charge higher prices. In this paper, we show that targeting of selling efforts may also inadvertently lead to sales spilling over to unprofitable customers when they are not identifiable. Such spillover sales are more likely when the ability of the salesperson and the profitability of target customers are above a threshold. We also show that firms can solve this problem by lowering the sales incentives as well as the price to make their offer unattractive to the unprofitable customers, a strategy commonly referred as screening. When the ability and profitability are both very high, however, the firm is better off allowing sales to unprofitable customers because the cost of preventing sales from spilling over is excessive. This is because the reduction in profits from the target customers that results under screening exceeds the loss from allowing sales to unprofitable customers. Such an accommodation strategy becomes more attractive as the fraction of unprofitable customers in the market decreases. Finally, we show that the spillover problem is even more acute when firms can monitor the selling efforts of a salesperson.